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Abstract
We study how foreign financial developments influence the conditional distribution of
domestic GDP growth. Within a quantile regression setup, we propose a method to par-
simoniously account for foreign vulnerabilities using bilateral-exposure weights when as-
sessing downside macroeconomic risks. Using a panel dataset of advanced economies, we
show that tighter foreign financial conditions and faster foreign credit-to-GDP growth are
associated with a more severe left tail of domestic GDP growth, even when controlling for
domestic indicators. The inclusion of foreign indicators significantly improves estimates of
‘GDP-at-Risk’, a summary measure of downside risks. In turn, this yields time-varying es-
timates of higher GDP growth moments that are interpretable and provide advanced warn-
ings of crisis episodes. Decomposing historical estimates of GDP-at-Risk into domestic and
foreign sources, we show that foreign shocks are a key driver of domestic macroeconomic
tail risks.
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1 Introduction
It is well established that domestic financial developments can generate downside risks to do-
mestic economic growth (Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone, 2019; Aikman, Bridges, Ha-
cioglu Hoke, O’Neill, and Raja, 2019) and, in turn, can influence the probability of crises (Schu-
larick and Taylor, 2012). But not all crises have domestic origins. In a highly interconnected
and increasingly synchronised global economy, international vulnerabilities can spill over to
the domestic risk environment. But how, and to what extent, does this occur?
In this paper, we document the crucial role of foreign vulnerabilities in determining down-
side risks to domestic economic growth. Tighter foreign financial conditions and faster foreign
credit-to-GDP growth can generate significant macroeconomic tail risks, even when control-
ling for domestic indicators. In particular, we show that they weigh heavily on ‘GDP-at-Risk’—
the 5th percentile of the GDP-growth distribution. A summary measure of downside macroe-
conomic risks, GDP-at-Risk is a now widely used concept in financial stability monitoring and
cost-benefit analysis informing macroprudential policy (Carney, 2020).
Foreign financial developments can influence domestic GDP-at-Risk, and the conditional
distribution of domestic GDP growth more generally, through a number of channels. First,
consistent with evidence of a global financial cycle (Rey, 2013; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey,
2020) characterised by strong cross-country comovement in asset prices, a substantial portion
of variation in domestic financial conditions can arise from global sources. Tighter global finan-
cial conditions can instantaneously impact domestic funding costs and risky asset prices, and,
in turn, the conditional distribution of future GDP growth outturns. Second, with financial in-
stitutions increasingly holding foreign claims, excessive credit growth and risk-taking abroad
can generate losses for domestic financial institutions and cause spillovers to the wider econ-
omy. Third, a build-up in foreign vulnerabilities that triggers a downturn abroad can spill over
to the domestic economy through broader macroeconomic channels—for instance by lowering
demand for domestic exports. While the influence of foreign factors on the mean of domestic
GDP growth is widely studied in the international business-cycle literature (see Corsetti, 2008,
and the references within), their influence on the tails of the domestic GDP growth distribution
is the subject of this paper.
In our key methodological contribution, we propose a general and parsimonious approach
to account for the influence of foreign vulnerabilities on the conditional distribution of domes-
tic GDP growth. We do so within a quantile regression setup (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) that
allows us to estimate the relationship between a range of indicators and the GDP-growth dis-
tribution over time and across countries. We account for foreign vulnerabilities by defining a
weighted average of indicators in the rest of the world using bilateral-exposure weights. This
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approach has the advantage of capturing country-specific exposures to foreign vulnerabilities,
while also limiting the number of additional regressors—a particular computational challenge
for quantile regression.
We then employ this methodology to a cross-country panel dataset of advanced economies.
Doing so provides novel empirical evidence demonstrating the link between foreign vulnera-
bilities and domestic GDP-at-Risk, as well as the conditional distribution of GDP growth more
generally. We emphasise four main findings.
First, we show that foreign vulnerabilities significantly influence the conditional distribu-
tion of future domestic GDP growth, even when controlling for domestic indicators. Higher
foreign equity volatility is associated with significant reductions in the left tail of domestic
GDP in the near term—i.e. less than 1 year. Faster foreign credit-to-GDP growth weighs on the
5th percentile of domestic GDP growth out to longer horizons—i.e. up to 5 years. Moreover,
the influence of foreign credit-to-GDP on the distribution of domestic GDP growth, in particu-
lar, is significantly larger at the 5th percentile than at the median, indicating that global credit
conditions can have non-linear impacts on domestic GDP.
Second, we demonstrate that the inclusion of foreign vulnerabilities significantly improves
estimates of domestic GDP-at-Risk. The goodness-of-fit for estimates of the 5th percentile
of domestic GDP are materially higher when foreign-weighted variables are included in the
quantile regression specification. Foreign indicators provide information relevant for estimat-
ing domestic GDP-at-Risk, over and above domestic ones.
Third, we break down the predictive power of foreign indicators in terms of their ability to
estimate different moments of the GDP-growth distribution. We demonstrate that the inclu-
sion of foreign indicators yields time-varying estimates of higher moments (over and above
the mean) that are more interpretable than from a model with domestic covariates only. In
the run-up to crises, the model with foreign covariates estimates a reduction in the skew of
GDP growth and an increase in kurtosis, in addition to a lower mean and higher variance. By
capturing vulnerabilities relevant for the tails of the GDP-growth distribution, foreign indi-
cators help to improve the narrative around moments estimated within a quantile regression
framework.
Finally, by orthogonalising domestic and foreign variables, we identify the contribution of
foreign shocks to historical estimates of GDP-at-Risk. We show that foreign vulnerabilities are
a key driver of domestic macroeconomic tail risks. On average, foreign shocks explain up to
around 71% of variation in the estimated 5th percentile of advanced-economy GDP growth at
the 3-year horizon, more than the comparable figure for the median.
Our results have important implications for financial stability policy. By highlighting the
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additional explanatory power of foreign variables to domestic GDP-at-Risk, we show the im-
portance of accounting for foreign indicators when monitoring risks to domestic financial sta-
bility. In addition, by demonstrating the substantial contribution of foreign shocks to domestic
tail risks, we highlight the importance of international macroprudential policy frameworks
that foster cooperation between national authorities when forming regulatory responses to
global shocks.
Related Literature Our paper is related to four main strands of literature. First, and most di-
rectly, our work builds on studies applying quantile regression techniques to assess the drivers
of macroeconomic tail risks (see, e.g., Adrian, Grinberg, Liang, and Malik, 2018; Adrian, Bo-
yarchenko, and Giannone, 2019; Aikman, Bridges, Burgess, Galletly, Levina, O’Neill, and
Varadi, 2018; Aikman, Bridges, Hacioglu Hoke, O’Neill, and Raja, 2019). Using data on ad-
vanced economies, these papers identify a strong relationship between domestic vulnerabilities,
such as financial conditions and credit growth, and the tails of the conditional GDP growth dis-
tribution. But they do not explicitly account for the influence of foreign vulnerabilities. These
will only be implicitly captured insofar as foreign vulnerabilities are reflected within domes-
tic indicators. We contribute to this body of work by exploring the independent influence of
foreign vulnerabilities, and propose a novel methodological framework for doing so.
Second, our study relates to a literature on financial crisis warning indicators. Building
on Schularick and Taylor (2012), who find credit-to-GDP to be a robust predictor of financial
crises, others have shown that foreign variables can have significant predictive power. For in-
stance, Cesa-Bianchi, Eguren-Martin, and Thwaites (2019) and Bluwstein, Buckmann, Joseph,
Kang, Kapadia, and Simsek (2020) find that global financial developments influence the prob-
ability of domestic crises, over and above domestic indicators. Our analysis extends this litera-
ture by documenting the influence of foreign factors on the whole conditional distribution of
GDP growth—not just crisis events.
Third, our work contributes to a growing literature assessing the ability of econometric
models to estimate higher moments of the GDP distribution. Recently, Plagborg-Møller, Reich-
lin, Ricco, and Hasenzagl (2020) argue that conditional moments of US GDP growth other than
the mean are poorly estimated by domestic financial conditions. In contrast, Delle Monache,
De Polis, and Petrella (2021) estimate interpretable time-varying moves in the variance and
skewness of US GDP growth, finding excess leverage and household credit to be significant
drivers of downside risks. We contribute to this literature by emphasising the role of foreign
indicators in delivering interpretable estimates of higher GDP moments over time.
Finally, our paper has links with the broad literature on disaster risks and economic growth
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(see, e.g., Barro, 2009; Barro and Ursúa, 2012; Gabaix, 2012; Gourio, 2012; Wachter, 2013). In
particular, our evidence emphasising the importance of foreign vulnerabilities for domes-
tic downside risks contributes to recent work highlighting the cross-border transmission of
macroeconomic disasters (Gourio, Siemer, and Verdelhan, 2013; Farhi and Gabaix, 2016).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our general method-
ology. Section 3 describes the results from a specific application, emphasising the additional
information foreign variables provide over and above domestic ones. Section 4 demonstrates
the contribution of foreign indicators to estimates of time-varying GDP moments. In Section 5,
we decompose GDP-at-Risk estimates into domestic and foreign shocks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology to Account for Global Drivers
In this section, we outline our general methodology to account for global drivers of GDP-at-
Risk, and the conditional distribution of GDP growth more generally. As in previous studies,
we employ a quantile regression framework (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) to study how changes
in a set of conditioning variables are associated with the distribution of future GDP growth.
We present our approach within a panel setting, where time is denoted by t = 1, ..., T and
the countries for whom we estimate the conditional distribution of GDP are labelled with i =
1, ..., N .1
We specify the following local-projection model (Jordà, 2005) for the conditional quantile





i (τ) + β
h(τ)Xi,t + ϑ
h(τ)X∗i,t (1)
where Q computes quantiles τ of the distribution of ∆hyi,t+h given two sets of covariates: Xi,t
and X∗i,t. α
h
i (τ) represents a potentially country- and quantile-specific constant.
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Domestic Covariates The domestic covariates in equation (1) are denoted by Xi,t. They in-
clude domestic indicators that may influence the conditional distribution of domestic GDP,
such as credit growth or proxies for financial conditions (see, e.g., Adrian et al., 2019; Aikman
et al., 2019). The coefficients βh(τ) denote the average association between domestic covariates
1Our general approach to accounting for global factors can also be applied to country-specific regressions.
2When we estimate the model in subsequent sections, we follow the approach of Canay (2011), which is best
suited to the dimensions of our panel dataset. This splits the constant into (i) a quantile-specific constant for all
countries αh(τ) and (ii) a country-specific fixed effect for all quantiles fhi . This approach permits a two-stage
estimation procedure, whereby country fixed effects are first estimated in a linear pooled panel model via OLS and
then quantile regressions are estimated given these fixed effects. Nevertheless, our approach to account for foreign
vulnerabilities does not depend on these specific assumptions about the constant term.
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and quantiles τ of the GDP-growth distribution.
Foreign Covariates The key novelty in equation (1) is the inclusion of foreign covariates X∗i,t.
The coefficients ϑh(τ) represent the average association between foreign indicators and the con-
ditional distribution of domestic GDP growth, holding domestic factors fixed. However, as we
explain in the next sub-section, the construction of these foreign variables is not trivial.
2.1 Constructing Foreign Covariates
To appreciate these challenges, consider a country i ∈ [1, N ] for whom we estimate the con-
ditional distribution of GDP growth using equation (1). The τ -th quantile of GDP growth in
country i can depend on domestic covariates Xi,t, but also a set of indicators Xj,t in a range of
other countries j = 1, ..., N∗.
In order to account for the influence of a single foreign indicator (e.g. credit-to-GDP) on the
conditional distribution of domestic (country-i) GDP, one approach could be to individually
add this indicator for each foreign country j = 1, ..., N∗, where j 6= i, to the foreign-covariate
set X∗i,t in equation (1). However, this would lead to a proliferation of regressors, adding an
extra N∗ − 1 explanatory variables. This could pose computational challenges for quantile
regression methods—especially if scaled up to more than one foreign indicator—and, in the
limit, would exhaust available degrees of freedom.
To circumvent this ‘curse of dimensionality’, for each indicator (e.g. credit-to-GDP) we
define a single foreign covariate x∗i,t ⊂ X∗i,t as the weighted sum of the indicator xj,t in all
other countries j = 1, ..., N∗. Defining ωi,j,t as a time-varying weight capturing the ‘bilateral








j=1 ωi,j,t = 1 and ωi,i,t = 0, for all i, t. With this definition, each additional foreign
indicator (e.g. credit-to-GDP) adds a single regressor (e.g. foreign-weighted credit-to-GDP) to
equation (1), offering a parsimonious solution to the curse of dimensionality. Furthermore, by
constructing the foreign covariates in this way, we can extend the number of foreign countries
N∗ that we account for, without increasing dimensionality. There is also no restriction that the
number of foreign countries N∗ needs to be the same as the number of domestic ones N .3
3For instance, we may estimate GDP-at-Risk for a set of N advanced economies, but want to account for
spillover channels from a broader set of countries N∗ > N , which may include major emerging markets in ad-
dition to the N advanced economies.
6
Moreover, by using weights ωi,j,t that capture country-specific bilateral exposures to the rest
of the world, we can account for heterogeneity in countries’ cross-border links. For instance,
we can ensure that countries with stronger ties to country i through trade or financial link-
ages (i.e. larger ωi,j,t) comprise a larger share of the foreign-weighted covariate and therefore
can have a stronger association with the conditional distribution of country-i GDP growth.
This desirable economic intuition would be lost were we to specify each x∗i,t as a simple global
aggregate (e.g. global credit-to-GDP), i.e. the sum (or unweighted average) of country-j indi-
cators.
So, our approach is parsimonious, while also maintaining a meaningful economic narrative
around cross-country links. As in the global vector autoregression (GVAR) literature, where
similar weighting schemes are applied to account for the influence of foreign factors at the
mean (Pesaran et al., 2004; Eickmeier and Ng, 2015), there are a number of candidate weighting
schemes that can be used too, depending on practitioners’ focus, including: bilateral trade
weights, bilateral financial linkages and combinations thereof.
3 Documenting the Global Drivers
In this section, we estimate the global drivers of the conditional distribution of GDP growth,
emphasising the additional information provided by foreign indicators.
3.1 Specific Empirical Model
We illustrate our general methodology using a specific empirical model. This model is deliber-
ately pared back, in order to highlight the influence of the key global drivers of the conditional
distribution of GDP growth. However, as we emphasise in Section 3.4, our key findings are
robust to a range of alternative model specifications, reflecting the generality of our approach.
We estimate the conditional distribution of GDP growth for 15 advanced economies: Aus-
tralia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). The dataset
spans the period 1981Q1 to 2018Q4.4 Our dependent variable is formally defined as annual av-
erage real GDP growth over h quarters, i.e. ∆hyi,t+h ≡ (yi,t+h − yi,t)/(h/4).
Domestic Covariates We include three domestic indicators in the variable set Xi,t: the one-
quarter realised volatility of equity prices; the three-year percentage point change in the ag-
gregate private non-financial credit-to-GDP ratio; and the lagged one-quarter growth of real
4See Appendix A for a full description of data sources.
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GDP.5 This variable choice is motivated by existing studies focusing on domestic GDP-at-Risk
(see, e.g., Adrian et al., 2019; Aikman et al., 2019). As in Aikman et al. (2019) specifically, we use
equity price volatility as a proxy for financial market conditions, while the change in credit-
to-GDP captures the evolution of the quantity of credit. We favour the three-year change in
this quantity to capture persistent changes in credit, which are thought to pose risks to finan-
cial stability and are leading indicators of macroeconomic crises (Schularick and Taylor, 2012).
Moreover, we choose to separate these two ‘vulnerability’ indicators—rather than use a single
aggregated indicator of price- and quantity-based vulnerabilities—to capture the differing in-
fluence of risk factors across horizons. As Adrian et al. (2018) and Aikman et al. (2019) show,
financial market prices tend to have a negative near-term influence on the left-tail of GDP
growth, while growth in the quantity of credit relative to GDP is associated with a medium-
term deterioration in GDP-at-Risk. Lagged quarterly real GDP growth is included as a control
for the prevailing state of the macroeconomy.
Foreign Covariates We include the foreign-weighted counterparts of each of the indicators
in the foreign variable set X∗i,t.
6 This variable choice is, in part, motivated by evidence that
global financial market indicators and credit quantities tend to predict domestic financial crises
(Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2019; Bluwstein et al., 2020). For our baseline results, we construct foreign-
weighted variables using data on bilateral trade linkages. Using data from IMF Direction of
Trade Statistics, we define the weights ωi,j,t as the fraction of country i’s exports to country
j at time t. This scheme will place higher weight on countries that country i exports more
extensively to, reflecting the fact that a downturn in one country j may spill over to another
i through reduced demand for country-i exports. Compared to the bilateral financial weights
from BIS International Banking Statistics we use in robustness analyses in Section 3.4, these
trade weights have the advantage of running back to 1980, enabling us to use time-varying
weights in the baseline specification. However, as we discuss there, our key results are ro-
bust to different combinations of country weights. Moreover, owing to constraints on data
availability, we focus on the same set of foreign countries used in the domestic variable set, i.e.
N = N∗ = 15.7
Interpretation and Inference For presentational purposes, we standardise all regressors by
the country-level mean and standard deviation. So, all coefficients can be interpreted as the
association between a one standard deviation change in an indicator and the τ -th quantile
5We discuss the robustness of our findings to different specifications of domestic risk factors in Section 3.4.
6We include alternative foreign risk indicators in robustness analyses reported in Section 3.4.
7We discuss the robustness of our findings to a broader specification of foreign countries in Section 3.4.
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of GDP growth. We estimate the local projection regression (1) for h = 1, 2, ..., 20 quarters.
For inference, we follow the block bootstrap procedure of Kapetanios (2008), resampling the
data over blocks of different time series dimensions to generate coefficient standard errors for
respective quantiles. As in Aikman et al. (2019), we resample time series observations using 8
blocks, replicating the bootstrap 5000 times.
3.2 Coefficient Estimates
We present coefficient estimates in two ways. First, we show the relationship between indica-
tors and GDP-at-Risk—i.e. the τ = 0.05-th quantile of GDP—across horizons h. Second, we
present the relationship between indicators across GDP quantiles τ at a given horizon h.
3.2.1 Coefficients Across Horizons
Figure 1 presents coefficient estimates at the 5th percentile of GDP across horizons h for equity
volatility and the 3-year change in credit-to-GDP—both domestic and foreign-weighted—from
our specific model (solid blue lines).8 These results highlight the differing association between
indicators and GDP-at-Risk over time.
Domestic Covariates The upper panels demonstrate the association between domestic indi-
cators and domestic GDP-at-Risk. Here, for comparison, we also present coefficient estimates
from a domestic-only specification (dashed red lines), which excludes the foreign-weighted
variables from the regressor set. The domestic-only model results are similar to those in Adrian
et al. (2018) and Aikman et al. (2019). Heightened equity volatility weighs negatively on the
left tail of GDP growth (i.e. GDP-at-Risk) in the near term—with the effect peaking in the first
quarter, then waning over time. Higher credit-to-GDP also has detrimental effects on the left-
tail of GDP in the near-to-medium term—the effect peaks around year 1 and persists out to
year 5.
The addition of foreign-weighted variables significantly alters the coefficient on domestic
equity volatility. Its magnitude is much reduced and generally insignificant across horizons.
At the 1-quarter horizon, a one standard deviation increase in domestic volatility is associated
with a 0.5pp deterioration in the 5th percentile of GDP growth—an estimate which is not sta-
tistically different from 0—compared to a 1.5pp reduction in the domestic-only specification.
This suggests that risks to the domestic macroeconomy reflected in domestic financial markets
tend to have global origins, mirroring findings in Eguren-Martin and Sokol (2019). While the
8Coefficient estimates for the macroeconomic control variables—domestic and foreign-weighted lagged quar-
terly GDP growth—are presented in Appendix B.1.
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Figure 1: Association between indicators and the 5th percentile of GDP growth across horizons
Note: Estimated association between one standard deviation change in each indicator at time t with 5th percentile
of annual average real GDP growth at each quarterly horizon. Red dashed lines denote coefficient estimates from
model that excludes foreign covariates. Solid blue lines denote coefficient estimates from model that includes
foreign covariates, and blue-shaded areas represent 68% confidence bands from block bootstrap procedure. Addi-
tional macroeconomic controls: domestic and foreign-weighted lagged quarterly real GDP growth.
coefficient on domestic credit growth is also smaller in the specification with foreign-weighted
indicators, it remains negative and statistically significant across horizons,9 suggesting that
global credit conditions have an impact on GDP-at-Risk over and above domestic one. At its
peak, a one standard deviation increase in domestic credit-to-GDP is associated with a 0.8pp
reduction in GDP-at-Risk, compared to a reduction of around 1.1pp in the domestic-only spec-
ification.
Foreign Covariates The lower panels illustrate the strong association between foreign indica-
tors and the left tail of domestic GDP growth. We find that higher foreign equity volatility is as-
sociated with a significant near-term reduction in the left-tail of annual average domestic GDP
9As Table 2 shows, these point estimates are statistically significant at the 99% level for h = 4, 12, 20.
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growth. The 1-quarter coefficient indicates that a one standard deviation increase in foreign-
weighted equity volatility is linked with a 0.7pp fall in the 5th percentile of GDP growth, larger
than the corresponding estimate for domestic equity volatility. This suggests that, on average,
foreign financial risk factors have more substantial effects on domestic macroeconomic tail
risks than domestic financial markets, highlighting an important role for financial spillovers.
At longer horizons, the point estimates for the coefficient on foreign-weighted equity volatil-
ity turn positive, indicating that financial conditions can pose an intertemporal trade-off for
GDP-at-Risk. Loose financial conditions can reduce tail risk in the near term, but generate
vulnerabilities that increase tail risk further out. This mirrors a finding in Adrian et al. (2018).
While this finding is neither strongly significant nor robust across different model specifica-
tions, the results in Figure 1 suggest that the trade-off—to the extent it exists—arises from
global financial conditions rather than domestic ones.
We also find that foreign-weighted credit-to-GDP weighs significantly on GDP-at-Risk in
the near-to-medium term. The coefficient is significantly negative from the third quarter on-
ward.10 At its peak, a one standard deviation increase in foreign-weighted credit-to-GDP is
associated with a 0.9pp reduction in the 5th percentile of GDP growth. Foreign credit growth
(relative to GDP) appears to have similar effects on the domestic macroeconomic risk outlook
as domestic credit-to-GDP.
3.2.2 Coefficients Across Quantiles
In Figures 2 and 3, we show complementary coefficient estimates to Figure 1. Focusing on
the horizons at which the foreign-weighted indicators have their peak effects on the left tail of
GDP growth, we present coefficient estimates across quantiles τ to assess the extent to which
there is a non-linear association between indicators and the conditional distribution of GDP
growth.
Equity Volatility Figure 2 plots the coefficient estimates for domestic and foreign-weighted
realised equity volatility across quantiles at h = 1. The left-hand plot demonstrates that the
addition of foreign-weighted variables has a significant impact on coefficient estimates for
domestic equity volatility across quantiles. At all quantiles, the magnitude of estimated co-
efficients is smaller in the foreign-augmented model. Although the coefficient is still most
negative at the 5th percentile, coefficient estimates are not significantly different across quan-
tiles.
10These point estimates are statistically significant at the 99% for h = 12, 20, as Table 2 shows.
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Figure 2: Association between domestic and foreign-equity volatility across quantiles at h = 1
Note: Estimated association between one standard deviation change in domestic or foreign-weighted realised eq-
uity volatility at time t with each quantile τ of average annual real GDP growth at horizon h = 1. Red dashed
lines denote coefficient estimates from model that excludes foreign covariates. Solid blue lines denote coefficient
estimates from model that includes foreign covariates, and blue-shaded areas represent 68% confidence bands from
block bootstrap procedure.
Figure 3: Association between domestic and foreign-equity credit-to-GDP across quantiles at
h = 8
Note: Estimated association between one standard deviation innovation to 3-year change in credit-to-GDP at time
t with each quantile τ of average annual real GDP growth at horizon h = 8. Red dashed lines denote coefficient
estimates from model that excludes foreign covariates. Solid blue lines denote coefficient estimates from model
that includes foreign covariates, and blue-shaded areas represent 68% confidence bands from block bootstrap pro-
cedure.
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The right-hand panel illustrates that foreign-weighted equity volatility has its strongest as-
sociation with tails of the GDP growth distribution. Although coefficient estimates are signifi-
cantly different from zero at all quantiles, they are not significantly different across quantiles.
Credit-to-GDP Coefficient estimates for the domestic and foreign-weighted 3-year change
in credit-to-GDP across quantiles at h = 8 are presented in Figure 3. The plots highlight a
strong non-linear association between the GDP growth distribution and credit-to-GDP growth.
Higher credit growth, relative to GDP, is associated with a significantly more left-skewed dis-
tribution. This is most strongly the case for foreign-weighted credit-to-GDP, whose coefficient
at the 5th percentile—of around 0.9pp—is around four-times larger than the coefficient esti-
mate at the median.
While domestic credit-to-GDP is also associated with a more left-skewed distribution of
GDP, the left-hand plot shows that the addition of foreign indicators reduces the extent to
which this is the case. Taken together, these findings indicate that faster global credit-to-GDP
growth is associated with more severe left-tail risk for domestic GDP.
These findings have some parallels with the early-warning literature, where faster global
credit growth is found to be a significant predictor of crises (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2019; Bluwstein
et al., 2020). However, our results are more general, suggesting that this predictability arises
specifically from the association between foreign variables and the left tail of the domestic GDP
growth distribution.
3.3 Additional Information from Foreign Variables
Our coefficient estimates indicate that, holding domestic factors fixed, changes in foreign fac-
tors can significantly influence the conditional distribution of future real GDP growth. How-
ever, a natural and complementary question is whether the inclusion of foreign covariates in
equation (1) significantly improves estimates of the predicted conditional distribution of GDP
growth.
Figure 4 helps motivate this question further, using the UK as an example. This compares
the estimated level of UK GDP-at-Risk at the 3-year horizon from the foreign-augmented and
domestic-only models set out in Section 3.1. Both models estimate a substantial fall in UK GDP-
at-Risk in the years proceeding both the 1990-1991 recession and the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC). This illustrates both models’ predictive power for tail events and potential usefulness
as an early-warning indicator. The foreign-augmented model picks up a sharper decline in UK
GDP-at-Risk from early 2005, with estimated the estimated value reaching −1.8% by 2006Q1,
compared to an estimate of −0.6% in the domestic-only model. This suggests that the foreign
13
Figure 4: Estimated UK GDP-at-Risk at 3-year horizon for domestic-only and foreign-
augmented models
Note: Blue and red lines denote the estimated forecast for the 5th percentile of annual average 3-year-ahead UK
GDP growth at each point in time using estimates from the foreign-augmented and domestic-only models (set out
in Section 3.1) respectively.
variables in the model—i.e. foreign financial conditions and foreign credit-to-GDP growth—
provide additional explanatory power over and above their domestic counterparts.
Next, we assess whether foreign variables add explanatory power to our quantile regres-
sion model more systematically. To do so, we draw on Koenker and Machado (1999), who
introduce a quantile-specific R1(τ) statistic, a ‘goodness-of-fit’ measure for quantile regres-
sion analogous to the conventional R2 statistic for OLS regression. While the R2 quantifies
the success of one model relative to another—typically a constant-only model—at the condi-
tional mean, the R1(τ) provides information on the relative performance of models at the τ -th
quantile.
To focus on the additional information from foreign variables, we compare the full (‘unre-
stricted’) foreign-augmented model (1) with the (‘restricted’) domestic-only model, i.e. one in
which ϑh(τ) is set to 0 at all quantiles τ and horizons h. Defining V̂ h(τ) as the sum of weighted
absolute residuals from the unrestricted model at the τ -th quantile and h-th horizon, and Ṽ h(τ)






As for R2, R1h(τ) ∈ [0, 1]. We can then interpret R1h(τ) as a measure of how much foreign aug-
11Note that, in our local projections setup, the R1h(τ) statistic is horizon-specific, as well as quantile-specific.
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mentation alters the goodness-of-fit of the estimated τ -th quantile of h-quarter-ahead real GDP
growth relative to the domestic-only model. Here, a higher R1h(τ) denotes a larger increase in
goodness-of-fit arising from the addition of foreign variables.
We present theR1h(τ) statistics at the 5th percentile, the median and the 95th percentile from
our specific model in Figure 5. The horizontal axis denotes the horizon at which each model is
estimated. Table 1 details Rh1(τ) statistics across a range of quantiles and horizons, alongside
their statistical significance—assessed using the likelihood ratio test described in Koenker and
Machado (1999).
Three observations are noteworthy. First, at all horizons, the R1h(τ) is highest for the 5th
percentile of real GDP growth, relative to both the median and the 95th percentile. So, the in-
clusion of foreign variables in equation (1) improves estimates of the left tail of the conditional
GDP growth distribution most materially.
Second,R1h(0.05) grows over short-to-medium-term horizons, peaking for 17-quarter-ahead
real GDP growth. So, the inclusion of foreign variables has the largest impact on estimates of
GDP-at-Risk at roughly the 4-year horizon.
Third, and consistent with the coefficient estimates across quantiles presented in Section
3.2, when carrying out a likelihood ratio test on the R1h(τ) statistic—as presented in Table 1—
we find the test statistics for the 5th percentile of GDP growth to be statistically significant
at the 1% level (at least) for all 20 horizons. As such, the inclusion of foreign variables has a
significant impact on estimates of the left tail of the conditional GDP distribution in particular,
improving the goodness-of-fit, mirroring the discussion in Section 3.2.2. This highlights the
importance of accounting for foreign variables when monitoring tail risks to domestic GDP
growth.
3.4 Robustness
As explained in Section 3.1, we have so far used a pared back model to focus on the key in-
sights gained from using our general methodology to account for the global drivers of GDP-at-
Risk, and the distribution of GDP growth more generally. Using this specific model, we have
shown that: (i) foreign-weighted variables exert a significant influence on domestic GDP-at-
Risk, even when accounting for domestic variables; (ii) foreign-weighted variables, in partic-
ular changes in credit-to-GDP, have a larger influence on the left tail of the conditional GDP
growth distribution than at the median; and (iii) foreign-augmentation can significantly im-
prove the goodness-of-fit of estimates of conditional quantiles of GDP growth, especially at
the left tail of the distribution.
As Table 2 summarises, these headline results are robust to a range of alternative model
15
Figure 5: Additional variation in fitted quantiles from foreign augmentation across horizons
measured by R1h(τ)
Note: R1h(τ) statistics (Koenker and Machado, 1999) comparing the foreign-augmented (‘unrestricted’) model to
the domestic-only (‘restricted’) model at the 5th percentile, median and 95th percentile of real GDP growth across
horizons.
Table 1: R1h(τ) across horizons and quantiles
Quantiles
Horizons τ = 0.05 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.95
h = 1 0.015*** 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.004*
h = 4 0.042*** 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.000
h = 8 0.086*** 0.026*** 0.003 0.004 0.010***
h = 12 0.084*** 0.035*** 0.018** 0.015 0.018***
h = 20 0.097*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.000
Note: R1h(τ) statistics comparing the foreign-augmented (‘unrestricted’) model to the domestic-only
(‘restricted’) across horizons and quantiles. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels denoted by ∗, ∗∗
and ∗ ∗ ∗ respectively. Statistical significance assessed using likelihood ratio test from Koenker and
Machado (1999).
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specifications. Across all specifications, the estimated coefficient on foreign-weighted credit-
to-GDP at the 5th percentile for medium-term horizons (i.e. 3-5 years) is significantly negative
at the 10% level at least. The estimate coefficient on foreign equity price volatility (or alterna-
tive measures of financial conditions) at the 5th percentile is significantly negative at near-term
horizons across all specifications at the 32% level at least. These coefficients are substantially
more negative than coefficients estimates for the median—typically by around a factor 2-3 at
the peak effect—indicating the influence of these foreign variables on the left tail of the con-
ditional GDP growth distribution in particular. Finally, across all specifications, R1h(0.05) is
significant at the 10% level, at least, for near-term horizons, and at the 1% level for medium-
term horizons—and is consistently larger than R1h(0.5). This indicates a robust and significant
improvement in the goodness-of-fit for estimates of the left tail of GDP growth from the inclu-
sion of foreign variables.
We discuss each of the robustness exercises summarised in Table 2 in more detail below.
Domestic Covariates In column 2 of Table 2, we present results from a specification with
additional domestic covariates. In this specification, we include domestic 3-year house price
growth, the capital ratio (a measure of overall banking system resilience), the current account,
the 1-year change in headline central bank policy rates and 1-year inflation in our domestic
covariate set—as in Aikman et al. (2019). In the this specification, the foreign variables we con-
struct continue to have explanatory power, as shown by the significant coefficient and R1h(τ)
estimates. This is particularly noteworthy given the inclusion of the current account in the
domestic covariate set.12 The current account is a measure of external imbalances, so could be
perceived as a sufficient proxy for risks emanating from abroad. However, our results indicate
that the current account is insufficient for capturing all foreign risks when monitoring finan-
cial stability, with foreign financial conditions and credit growth having additional explanatory
power.
Financial Conditions Index In column 3 of Table 2, we present results from a specification
using a financial conditions index (FCI), as in Eguren-Martin and Sokol (2019), in place of
equity price volatility. The FCI is a summary measure that extracts common variation across a
range of asset prices—including term spreads, interbank spreads, corporate spreads, sovereign
spreads, policy rates, equity returns and equity volatility. As our FCI data only begins in 1995,
we shorten the sample for this robustness exercise. We find that a rise in weighted foreign
12For the purposes of this paper, we formally distinguish between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ covariates in relation
to the dimensionality challenges discussed in Section 2.1. As there is a single current account series per domestic
country in our dataset, we do not need to construct a weighted measure using equation (2). Therefore, we define


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FCIs (signalling a tightening in foreign financial conditions) has a particularly strong negative
effect on the left tail of domestic GDP growth at near-term horizons that is significant at the 5%
level. We find limited evidence of a switch in the sign of the coefficient on foreign FCIs at longer
horizons—the coefficient remains negative at h = 12 and is only just positive (and insignificant
from zero) at h = 20. Hence, we do not find robust evidence of an intertemporal trade-off for
GDP-at-Risk from asset prices alone when separately controlling for credit-to-GDP growth.
Foreign Weighting Scheme In our baseline specification, we use trade weights to capture
countries’ bilateral exposures. These weights have the advantage of running back to 1980, en-
abling us to use time-varying weights. However, we find similar results when we use bilateral
financial weights using BIS International Banking Statistics that capture banks’ exposures to
the rest of the world (column 4 of Table 2).13
Foreign Country Set In column 5 of Table 2, we present results from a specification where
we extend the set of countries used to define foreign-weighted covariates. We increase our
foreign country set (N∗) to 21, by including 6 emerging market economies (China, Korea, In-
donesia, Mexico, Turkey and Hong Kong) in addition to the 15 advanced economies used in
our baseline specification. We maintain our domestic variable set (N ) at 15, as in the baseline.
We shorten the sample for this specification due to limited data availability in some emerg-
ing market economies. The results from this model are very similar to our baseline results,
although we find slightly larger effects of foreign variables on domestic GDP-at-Risk when we
extend the foreign country set.
4 Estimating Higher Moments of the GDP Growth Distribution
In this section, we assess the specific contribution of foreign vulnerabilities to higher moments
of the distribution of GDP growth using the specific model described in Section 3.1.
Using a different model to ours, the results in Plagborg-Møller et al. (2020) suggest that
quantile regression techniques are only able to estimate interpretable changes in the condi-
tional mean of the GDP growth distribution. Yet the motivation for employing a quantile
regression methodology, in favour of standard OLS-based techniques, to estimate the entire
conditional distribution of GDP growth rests on the belief that the relationship between GDP
growth and a set of covariates differs across quantiles. A quantile regression setup can provide
estimates specific to the quantiles of the GDP growth distribution, and thus GDP-at-Risk, that
13Owing to data limitations, we construct time invariant bilateral financial weights using average values from
2005 to 2018.
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could missed by standard forecasting models which focus only on estimating the conditional
mean. So, the usefulness of the quantile regression framework rests on its ability to estimate
meaningful changes in higher-order moments of the GDP growth distribution.
To test our own model against this challenge, we break down the estimated GDP growth
distribution into its moments. We consider whether the changes in the distribution in the run-
up to crisis events are driven by changes in the predicted mean—i.e. locational shifts of the GDP
distribution—or by changes in higher moments—i.e. changes in the shape of the GDP distri-
bution. In particular, we focus on the extent to which the addition of foreign variables can
improve the narrative around higher moments estimated within a quantile regression frame-
work.
Method We construct estimates for the time-varying moments of the GDP growth distribu-
tion following the methodology in Adrian et al. (2019). We begin with the quantile regression
model set out in Section 3.1, estimated at quantiles τ = 0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.95. We use this to es-
timate conditional quantiles of GDP growth Q∆hyi,t+h(τ |Xi,t,X
∗
i,t) for country i at horizon h
and time t. We then fit a skew-t distribution (Azzalini and Capitanio, 2003) to the estimated
quantiles to recover a full estimated probability density function at each point in time. We then
calculate the conditional moments of these fitted distributions for GDP growth at each point
in time to construct time-varying estimates of the moments.
Results Figure 6 shows the estimated time-varying moments for UK GDP growth at the 3-
year horizon for both our foreign-augmented baseline and the restricted domestic-only model.
As already highlighted in Figure 4, both models estimate a fall in UK GDP-at-Risk in the
run-up to the GFC. Figure 6 shows that this estimated fall in the 5th percentile partly reflects
an estimated fall in the mean from around 2005Q1 across both models—where this fall is more
pronounced for the foreign-augmented than the domestic-only model. Both models estimate a
sharp rise in variance related to the GFC—although this is with significant delay, with a clear
spike only emerging around 2009H2, once the UK was already in a recession.
Crucially, for the foreign-augmented model, the estimates of other higher moments exhibit
clear interpretable patterns. In particular, in the run-up to the GFC (2004-2008), the model
predicts a notable fall in the skew and a rise in the kurtosis of UK GDP growth—with the
distribution becoming most left-skewed and fat-tailed around 2006Q2. Therefore, the model
provides a useful advanced warning, not just of a leftward shift in the distribution of future
GDP growth, but also a significant fattening in the left-hand tail, well in advance of the GFC.
In contrast, the domestic-only model estimates little change in the skew and kurtosis of
20
Figure 6: Estimated time-varying moments of UK GDP at the 3-year horizon
Note: Estimates of time-varying moments of the UK GDP distribution at the 3-year horizon. The blue line shows the
estimates from the foreign-augmented model while the red line shows the estimates from the restricted domestic-
only model, as described in Section 3.1.
GDP growth over time—and in particular, does not pick-up a noticeable change in these higher
moments ahead of the GFC. This suggests that the model outlined in Section 3.1 is able to pre-
dict interpretable moves in higher moments of the 3-year ahead UK GDP growth distribution,
and that the addition of foreign variables improves these predictions.
Figure 7 assesses the extent to which these results hold more generally across countries. It
shows the estimated change in the moments of the GDP growth distribution across countries
in the panel in the run-up to the GFC at the 3-year horizon (h = 12).
The figure demonstrates that the foreign-augmented model is able to pick up interpretable
moves in higher moments of the GDP growth distribution across all countries. In particular,
between 1997Q1 and 2006Q1—a full 3-years before the peak macroeconomic impact of the
GFC—the model estimates a significant fall in the skew of the 12-quarter-ahead GDP growth
distribution for all countries in the panel.14 The model also estimates a rise in variance and









































































































































































kurtosis for most countries—although the results here are more mixed.
Interestingly, as in Figure 6 for the UK, the estimated fall in skew is consistently and sub-
stantially larger in the foreign-augmented model than the domestic-only model, by around 4-5
times on average across the panel. This suggests that at longer horizons, the additional pre-
dictive power from foreign variables pertains to information about higher moments of the GDP
growth distribution, other than the mean. This is also consistent with the results discussed in
Sections 3.2.2 and 3.3 that highlight the effect of foreign variables on the left tail of the GDP
growth distribution in particular.
This finding is particularly stark for Germany. The domestic-only model estimates a rise in
skew and fall in kurtosis for 12-quarter-ahead GDP growth in the run-up to the GFC, suggest-
ing a reduction in downside risk. However, it is only with the addition of foreign variables
that the model picks up intuitive changes in the shape of the German GDP growth distri-
bution in this period, with greater probability mass in the left tail. This reflects the fact that
domestic vulnerabilities—particularly domestic credit-to-GDP growth—were relatively low in
Germany in the years preceding the GFC. Hence, an assessment of tail risks to German GDP
growth reliant on domestic vulnerabilities alone fails to provide an early warning signal of the
upcoming crisis.
Figure 8 presents a comparable plot for the 1-quarter-ahead horizon (h = 1), focusing on
the change in moments between 1997Q1 and 2008Q3, 1 to 2 quarters ahead of the trough in
quarterly GDP growth associated with the GFC. As with the 3-year-ahead results in Figure
7, the moves in higher moments are interpretable and there are some differences between the
foreign-augmented and domestic-only models. Unlike at the 3-year-ahead horizon, the clearest
differences between the models are seen in the estimated conditional variance. For all but one
country, the foreign-augmented model identifies a larger rise in the variance of GDP growth
up to 2008Q3 than the domestic-only model. At h = 1, the differences between the foreign-
augmented and domestic-only models are less marked for estimates of skew and kurtosis.
Taken together, these results indicate the addition of foreign-weighted variables within
a quantile regression framework can generate more interpretable estimates of time-varying
moments of the conditional GDP growth distribution, especially in the run-up to the GFC. At
medium-term horizons (i.e. h = 12), this manifests in changes in higher moments of the GDP
growth distribution—the skew and kurtosis in particular. While at near-term horizons (i.e.
h = 1), the effect is more pronounced for estimates of the conditional variance.
Discussion These conclusions are particularly noteworthy in light of recent work by Plagborg-











































































































































































focusing their analysis most closely on the US and on near-term horizons (particularly h = 1
and h = 4).15 They find that estimated movements in higher moments of US GDP growth are
not informative and that, in particular, the estimated skewness and kurtosis do not show any
interpretable movement around recessions. This differs from our results discussed above.
For comparison purposes, we present full time-varying estimates of the moments of US
GDP growth across horizons in Appendix B.2.16 In line with our above discussion, and un-
like Plagborg-Møller et al. (2020), we find clearly interpretable moves in higher moments of
US GDP growth at near-term horizons (h = 1 and h = 4)—with intuitive moves across all
moments of the GDP distribution around crisis events. In general, the mean and skewness of
the distribution tend to fall, while the variance and kurtosis tend to rise around the three US
recessions in our sample (1990Q1-1991Q1, 2001Q1-2001Q3, 2007Q4-2009Q2).
Moreover, our findings carry over to medium-term horizons. These horizons are likely to
be more relevant for macroprudential policymakers when monitoring risks to financial stabil-
ity given policy implementation and transmission lags. Corroborating with the evidence dis-
cussed above, we find that the skewness of 12-quarter-ahead US GDP growth shows a steady
decline well in advance of the three US recessions in our sample (see Appendix B.2).
There are two key reasons for the differences in results. First, we do not aggregate macro-
financial variables into a single indicator, but rather separate out asset price variables (in our
baseline case, equity price volatility) from credit quantities (credit-to-GDP). Our results are
consistent with the general conclusion that asset price variables are of limited use in provid-
ing advanced warning signals of upcoming crises. This is in line with the intuition that asset
prices are largely endogenous and tend to react to negative news around the economic out-
look. For example, the largest spike in equity price volatility, which drives a sharp rise in the
estimated variance of the US GDP growth distribution at near-term horizons, only occurs in
2008Q4—after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In contrast, we find that
credit quantities do provide a useful signal of changes in higher moments of the GDP growth
distribution, well in advance of crisis episodes. Second and in line with the key contribution of
our paper, unlike Plagborg-Møller et al. (2020), we include foreign-weighted variables in our
quantile regression alongside domestic variables. As discussed above, adding these foreign
variables aids interpretation of estimated higher moments of the GDP growth distribution,
especially at medium-term horizons.
15In a specific application in their paper, Plagborg-Møller et al. (2020) estimate a quantile regression for US
GDP growth across horizons. They include three regressors in that regression: (i) a single factor of real, financial,
monetary, and price variables; (ii) a factor of financial variables only (orthogonal to (i)); and (iii) lagged GDP
growth.
16As above, we focus on in-sample fit here. Plagborg-Møller et al. (2020) also provide estimates of higher mo-
ments from an out-of-sample forecast.
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5 Decomposing Estimates of GDP-at-Risk
In this section, we decompose historical estimates of GDP-at-Risk, aiming to identify the con-
tribution of foreign shocks to domestic tail risks.
An immediate challenge to constructing this decomposition arises from the potential cor-
relation of domestic and foreign covariates in equation (1). For example, consistent with evi-
dence of a global financial cycle (Rey, 2013; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2020), tighter finan-
cial conditions abroad are likely to spill over to the domestic economy, generating a contempo-
raneous tightening in domestic financial conditions that, in turn, can drive changes in domestic
GDP-at-Risk. The estimated coefficient on foreign financial conditions in equation (1) effec-
tively “partials out” this effect however, by controlling for domestic financial conditions. So,
simply decomposing the drivers of GDP-at-Risk using the fitted values from equation (1)—i.e.
β̂h(τ)Xi,t representing domestic drivers and ϑ̂h(τ)X∗i,t foreign drivers—will likely only yield
a lower bound estimate for the relative importance of foreign shocks.
5.1 Towards a Structural Decomposition
To identify the relative contribution of foreign and domestic shocks to domestic GDP-at-Risk,
we build a decomposition using a two-step procedure.
In the first step, we orthogonalise the domestic variables with respect to their foreign-
weighted counterparts. To do this, we estimate the following OLS regression for each domestic
indicator xi,t ⊂ Xi,t and for each country i = 1, ..., N :





where ai and bi denote country- and indicator-specific coefficients, and u⊥i,t represents the com-
ponent of a domestic indicator xi,t that is orthogonal to contemporaneous variation in foreign-
weighted indicators X∗i,t. Given coefficient estimates {âi, b̂i} from equation (4), we define the
estimated orthogonal component as the residual:
û⊥i,t = xi,t − âi − b̂iXi,t
In the second step, we then estimate a local-projection model for the conditional quantile
function of h-period-ahead GDP growth using the estimated orthogonal component of do-












where we distinguish coefficients in this equation, relative to equation (1), with tildes. We
can then decompose estimates of GDP-at-Risk, by labelling ˆ̃βh(τ)u⊥i,t as ‘domestic drivers’ and
ˆ̃
ϑh(τ)X∗i,t as ‘foreign drivers’.
The key assumption in this two-step procedure is that foreign indicators can contempo-
raneously influence domestic ones, but domestic indicators cannot contemporaneously affect
their foreign counterparts. In effect, we treat the domestic country as a small-open economy,
by excluding instantaneous feedback from domestic variables to foreign ones. This mirrors
the block exogeneity assumption that has been widely used to estimate the transmission of
shocks at the mean using structural vector autoregression methods in the empirical interna-
tional macroeconomics literature (see, e.g., Cesa-Bianchi and Sokol, 2017; Dedola, Rivolta, and
Stracca, 2017).
Importantly, while this two-step procedure does orthogonalise foreign-weighted variables
with respect to their domestic counterparts, it does not enable a structural decomposition of
shocks within countries. So, this procedure can isolate the relative importance of foreign shocks
for domestic GDP-at-Risk. But it cannot distinguish between, for example, different domestic
(or foreign) shocks within that (e.g. shocks to domestic financial conditions versus shocks to
domestic credit growth) in a structural sense.
5.2 Estimated Decompositions
We now apply this orthogonalisation procedure to our specific empirical model to estimate the
relative importance of foreign drivers of GDP-at-Risk. In this sub-section, we present results
for the baseline model outlined in Section 3.1, albeit with one change. To justify the ‘small-
open economy’ assumption implicit in the orthogonalisation, we exclude the US from the set
of domestic economies when estimating the structural decompositions. Nevertheless, we con-
tinue to include the US in the foreign variable set, so we continue to account for its influence
in the global economy.
Figure 9 shows the orthogonalised decomposition for the estimated 5th percentile of 3-year-
ahead UK real GDP growth. The orthogonalised decomposition suggests that the estimated
fall in UK 3-year GDP-at-Risk in the run-up to the 1990-1991 recession was predominantly
driven by domestic drivers (red bars), in particular growth in domestic credit-to-GDP. Foreign
drivers (blue bars) played a limited role. Following this recession, these factors reversed with
the estimated rise in the 5th percentile of UK 3-year GDP growth supported by both domestic
and foreign factors.
Tail risks built up substantially over the 2000s though—with estimated GDP-at-Risk be-
coming more negative from 2005 especially, driven largely by a build-up in foreign-weighted
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credit-to-GDP. This accords with the well established view that the GFC had global origins,
driven by worldwide trends in an increasingly interconnected international financial system.
Since the GFC, these drivers of tail risks have again reversed, likely tempered by enhanced
macroprudential policy toolkits and global monitoring of the financial system.
Figure 10 presents the comparable decomposition for German 3-year GDP-at-Risk. The rel-
ative evolution of domestic and foreign shocks in the run-up to the GFC is particularly notable
for Germany. Domestic factors—in particular domestic credit-to-GDP—are associated with
improvements in the left tail of the GDP growth distribution from 2004 to 2008. In contrast,
foreign-weighted credit-to-GDP growth is associated with a worsening in tail risk over the
same period. In sum, these foreign factors dominate and contribute to an overall fall in fitted
GDP-at-Risk over the period, exemplifying the importance of accounting for global influences
when monitoring macro-financial risks.
5.3 Contribution of Foreign Drivers
As well as provide narrative evidence, this orthogonalised decomposition can be used to as-
sess the role of foreign drivers of tail risk more systematically. Because equation (4) imposes
covt(Xi,t,X∗i,t) = 0, then the variance of fitted values of the τ -th percentile of the GDP-growth















Therefore, the share of variation in the fitted value of country-i GDP growth at the τ -th per-
centile at horizon h attributable to foreign sources can be defined as:








The estimated shares ForSharehi (τ) at h = 1, 4, 12 and τ = 0.05 for each country in our
baseline regression are presented in Figure 11. Due to the stringency of the orthogonalisation
assumption imposed by equation (4), we interpret these quantities as upper-bound estimates
for the share of variation attributable to foreign sources.
Overall, Figure 4 illustrates that a substantial portion of variation in estimates of the GDP-
growth distribution can be attributed to foreign sources for all 14 countries in our sample.
At the 1-quarter horizon, the average share of variation in GDP-at-Risk (i.e. τ = 0.05) from
foreign sources is 89%, around 13pp more than the variation attributed to foreign sources at
the median (τ = 0.5). Although there is variation across countries, this finding emphasises the
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Figure 9: Estimated orthogonalised decomposition of UK GDP-at-Risk at the 3-year horizon
Note: Solid black line denotes estimated 5th percentile of annual average 3-year-ahead GDP growth at each point
in time. The bars show the contribution of each indicator to that total from estimates of equation (5).
Figure 10: Estimated orthogonalised decomposition of German GDP-at-Risk at the 3-year hori-
zon
Note: Solid black line denotes estimated 5th percentile of annual average 3-year-ahead GDP growth at each point
in time. The bars show the contribution of each indicator to that total from estimates of equation (5).
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Figure 11: Share of variation in fitted values (%) attributed to foreign shocks across horizons at
the 5th percentile
Note: Share of variation at the 5th percentile (τ = 0.05) of country-GDP distributions at different horizons: h = 1
(1 quarter), h = 4 (1 year), and h = 12 (3 years). Share definition in equation (6). Shares constructed from baseline
model in which domestic indicators are orthogonalised with respect to all foreign indicators, akin to a small-open
economy assumption for domestic countries.
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crucial role for foreign vulnerabilities at the left tail of the GDP growth distribution specifically.
While the share of variation attributable to foreign sources tends to decline as horizons h
increase, the relative importance of foreign factors remains substantial. At the 3-year horizon,
the average share of GDP-at-Risk variation linked with foreign shocks is 71%, around 8pp
more than the corresponding estimate at the median.
Robustness We assess the robustness of the results presented in Figure 11 by estimating com-
parable decompositions for two alternative models. First, we estimate our baseline model, but
construct foreign-weighted variables using bilateral financial weights from BIS International
Banking Statistics. Second, we estimate a model with more domestic and foreign covariates,
mirroring the specification in Aikman et al. (2019). We continue to exclude the US from the
domestic variable set when constructing these decompositions. The results are discussed in
Appendix B.3. However, our key finding—that foreign factors play a dominant role in ex-
plaining variation in the estimated 5th percentile of GDP growth, and more so than for the
median—is robust in both alternative model specifications.
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that foreign vulnerabilities matter for domestic macroeconomic tail
risks. Faster global credit-to-GDP growth and tighter global financial conditions exert a sig-
nificant negative influence on the left tail of the GDP-growth distribution. Moreover, these
foreign indicators significantly increase the goodness-of-fit for estimates of GDP-at-Risk. In
turn, these foreign indicators help to generate estimates of higher GDP moments that are inter-
pretable and provide advanced warnings of crisis episodes. Decomposing historical estimates
of GDP-at-Risk into orthogonalised domestic and foreign shocks, we show that foreign vul-
nerabilities on average explain up to around 71% of variation at the 3-year horizon, more than
the comparable figure for the median.
Taken together, our findings have important implications for macroprudential policymak-
ers. By highlighting the relevance of global spillovers, they emphasise the importance of
monitoring global variables when assessing risks to domestic financial stability. Moreover,
by demonstrating the substantial contribution of foreign shocks to domestic tail risks, they





Table 3 presents a full list of data sources used in this paper—both in the main body and the
appendices.
Table 3: List of Data Sources
Variable Source Frequency Notes
Dependent Variable
Real GDP OECD Quarterly Construct annual average growth across
quarterly horizons
Covariates
Equity Volatility Datastream Daily Calculate realised volatility within quarter
using standard deviation of daily returns
Credit-to-GDP BIS Quarterly Construct 3-year change in ratio
Current account OECD Quarterly Percent of real GDP
House Prices OECD Quarterly Construct 3-year growth
Capital Ratio Aikman
et al. (2019)
Annual Ratio of tangible common equity to tangible
assets
Inflation OECD Quarterly Annual growth of CPI
Policy Rates BIS Quarterly Annual change in central bank policy rates
Bilateral Weights
Export Weights IMF DOTS Quarterly Construct weights by averaging across each
calendar year to smooth seasonal variation
Financial Weights BIS IBS, Tbl.
9D
Quarterly Construct weights by averaging across each
calendar year to smooth seasonal variation
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B Additional Results
B.1 Baseline Empirical Model
In this Appendix sub-section, we report additional results for our specific model described in
Section 3.1.
Coefficient Estimates for Macroeconomic Controls Across Horizons Figure 12 presents co-
efficient estimates for the macroeconomic control variables—domestic and foreign-weighted
lagged quarterly real GDP growth—at the τ = 0.05-th quantile across horizons in our specific
model described in Section 3. Both domestic and foreign-weighted lagged real GDP growth
are associated with higher estimates of the 5th percentile of real GDP growth.
Figure 12: Association between indicators and the 5th percentile of GDP growth across hori-
zons
Note: Estimated association between one standard deviation change in each indicator at time t with 5th percentile
of average annual real GDP growth at each quarterly horizon. Red dashed lines denote coefficient estimates from
model that excludes foreign covariates. Solid blue lines denote coefficient estimates from model that includes
foreign covariates, and blue-shaded areas represent 68% confidence bands from block bootstrap procedure.
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B.2 US GDP Moments
In this Appendix sub-section, we present estimates of time-varying moments of US GDP
growth from our baseline specification. These results are described in Section 4.
Figure 13: Estimated time-varying moments of US GDP at the 1-quarter horizon
Note: Estimates of time-varying moments of the US GDP distribution at the 1-quarter horizon. The blue line
shows the estimates from the foreign-augmented model while the red line shows the estimates from the restricted
domestic-only model, as described in Section 3.1.
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Figure 14: Estimated time-varying moments of US GDP at the 1-year horizon
Note: Estimates of time-varying moments of the US GDP distribution at the 1-year horizon. The blue line shows the
estimates from the foreign-augmented model while the red line shows the estimates from the restricted domestic-
only model, as described in Section 3.1.
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Figure 15: Estimated time-varying moments of US GDP at the 2-year horizon
Note: Estimates of time-varying moments of the US GDP distribution at the 2-year horizon. The blue line shows the
estimates from the foreign-augmented model while the red line shows the estimates from the restricted domestic-
only model, as described in Section 3.1.
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Figure 16: Estimated time-varying moments of US GDP at the 3-year horizon
Note: Estimates of time-varying moments of the US GDP distribution at the 3-year horizon. The blue line shows the
estimates from the foreign-augmented model while the red line shows the estimates from the restricted domestic-
only model, as described in Section 3.1.
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B.3 Structural Decompositions
In this Appendix sub-section, we present details of the robustness exercises we run to comple-
ment the structural decompositions in Section 5.
Specifically, we estimate structural decompositions from two model variants, in addition
to the baseline model.
First, we re-estimate our baseline model, weighting foreign variables using bilateral finan-
cial linkages measured using BIS International Banking Statistics. Compared to our baseline
model, which includes 14 countries in the domestic variable set, this financially-weighted
model includes 11 domestic economies owing to data availability.
Second, we estimate an extended model, akin to that in Aikman et al. (2019). Here, the
domestic variable set includes 3-year house price growth, the current account, bank capital
ratios, 1-year CPI inflation and the 1-year change in central bank policy rates, in addition to
our baseline domestic indicators (3-year change in credit-to-GDP growth and lagged quarterly
real GDP growth).
The estimated share of variation in fitted values attributable to foreign shocksForSharehi (τ),
defined in equation (6), at h = 1, 4, 12 and τ = 0.05, 0.5 from these two models, alongside the
baseline, are presented in Table 4.
In all three models, the majority of of variation in estimated percentiles of GDP growth is
attributable to foreign shocks in most cases. Moreover, foreign factors exert a larger influence
on fitted values at the left tail of the GDP distribution, i.e. the 5th percentile, than at the median,
corroborating the results in Figure 11. Although the foreign share is lowest for the extended
model, this is unsurprising given that it includes more domestic covariates than the baseline
or its financially-weighted variant. Even so, the results in Table 4 indicate that, across models,
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